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Abstract
In many applications of coalition formation games, a key issue is
that some desirable coalition structures are not elements of the core
of these games. In these cases, it would be useful for an authority
which aims to implement a certain outcome to know how far from the
original game is the nearest game where the desirable outcome is part
of the core. This question is at the center of this study. Focusing on
hedonic games, we uncover previously unexplored links between such
games and transferrable utility games, and develop a tailor-made so-
lution concept for the transferrable utility game, the implementation
core, to provide an answer to our question.
JEL Classication Number: C71, D71.
Keywords: hedonic game, implementation core, Kemeny distance, sta-
bility.
1 Introduction
Given a situation in which a certain desirable outcome is unachievable, one
may ask the following two questions:
 How far o¤ from the desirable outcome is the achievable?
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 How far o¤ is the situation where the desirable outcome is achievable?
The former question underlied the theory of the second best. The latter 
and the one at the center of our work contributes to the theory of economic
design.
An economic designer can be viewed as an authority external to an eco-
nomic situation who is endowed with the knowledge of the range of possible
outcomes and a clear judgement of their desirability. Traditionally, its role
has been to exercise authority to impose an outcome on the society, as in
the case of a social planner, or to design specic and detailed procedures as
an auctioneer would. The designer we aim to inform with our study targets
fundamental preferences, instead, and operates in the context of coalition
formation. In particular, our focus is on hedonic games (cf. Drèze and
Greenberg, 1980) - a class of non-transferrable utility games where the indi-
vidual decision about which group to join depends (at least to an extent) on
the identity of the other group members.
A key issue and a very natural desirable property of any outcome in coali-
tion formation is the coalitional stability, i.e., the immunity of coalitions to
deviations by individuals or groups of players. In the analysis of the stability
of coalitions the notion of the core takes a central stage. In many real-life ap-
plications of coalition formation problems, however, the core is either empty
or the most desirable coalition is not an element of it. Take as an example a
market with avoidable xed costs, extensively studied both theoretically and
empirically in Sjostrom (1989). In such a market rms may form agreements
to adhere to common price lists and output schedules. In any possible agree-
ment structure, however, there is a rm that faces incentives to renege on the
agreement. International environmental agreements present us with another
silent example where the most desirable form of agreement, the grand coali-
tion, is not stable and a stable cooperation structure of binding agreements
is evasive.
Much research in cooperative game theory has focused on studying the
underlying properties of the game that ensures non-emptiness of the core. In
the context of hedonic games, Banerjee et al. (2001) and Bogomolnaia and
Jackson (2002) focus on properties of preference proles, while Pápai (2004)
identies properties of permissible coalition structures.
Our research agenda is complementary to that: we identify games as near
as possible to the original where the core is non-empty, and moreover, a pre-
specied coalitional structure is an element of it. The distance between the
2
two games is dened on the di¤erences between the two corresponding pref-
erence proles. Here we employ a standard measure of a swap distance in
orders - the Kemeny distance (cf. Kemeny, 1959) - for its natural character-
istics.1
For the purposes of this exercise we translate the hedonic game into a
transferrable utility game (TU-game) using the rankings of players and the
specied desirable coalition structure, . The value of each coalition in the
TU-game can be interpreted as the claim this coalition makes against the
formation of . To analyze this game we develop a tailored solution concept
for the TU-game that assumes the presence of an external authority that
has a budget B to satisfy all claims by the coalition. We name this concept
the implementation core and show that the implementation core when the
budget is zero is non-empty if and only if  is an element of the core of the
hedonic game. In case the implementation core is empty, we consider a min-
imal increase in the authoritys budget to render the implementation core at
the new budget level non-empty. We show that this minimal increase in the
budget equals the Kemeny distance between the original game and a hedonic
game where  is a core element. We further show how any implementation
core element can be used to construct a new hedonic game with the desirable
property that  is core stable for the new game. Thus, one can interpret
the changes in the playerspreference proles to the new games as compen-
sations measured in coalitional ranking that these players receive when  is
implemented.
In this last respect our analysis is in the spirit of an early work of van
Gellekom et al. (1999) and more recent ones by Bejan and Gómez (2009) and
Bachrach et al. (2013), who study in the context of TU-games how much one
needs to increase the value of the grand coalition in a cooperative game for a
certain solution concept applied to this game to be non-empty. van Gellekom
et al. (1999) take the increase in the grand coalitions value as an increase in
prosperity while the latter works interpret it is as the necessary subsidy given
out by an exogenous regulator. A similar question to ours is also studied by
Nguyen and Vohra (2016) in the context of many-to-one matching problems
with couples. In their study the distance between a matching problem with
an empty core and a nearby problem where the core is non-empty is measured
1We refer to a recent work by Can and Storcken (2013) for a characterization of the
Kemeny distance. In addition, Bossert et al. (2016) argue that such distance-based
measures can successfully be applied to assessing social status changes and social mobility.
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in terms of the capacity of the rm-side of the market.
Next we present the set-up of the problem and in section 3 we discuss
illustrative examples. In section 4 we present our main results.
2 A preliminary discussion
Given a hedonic game (N;) and a partition  of the player set N , we
start by constructing an associated TU-game (N; v). In this TU-game, v
is a standard characteristic function representing the claim a coalition may
have with respect to the partition . More precisely, for each nonempty
coalition S  N , we dene v(S) to be the minimal amount (dened in
terms of rank di¤erences) one needs in order to please the cheapestplayer
in S and thus, to make S a non-blocking coalition for  in the hedonic
game (N;). For a given budget B  0 that can be used by an authority
to implement , we dene then in a suitable way the implementation core
of (N; v) denoted by i-core(N; v;B) such that
  is in the core of the hedonic game if and only if i-core(N; v; 0) is
non-empty;
 when  is in the core of the hedonic game, then i-core(N; v; 0) is
a singleton in which the unique allocation assigns zero payo¤ to each
player.
When  is not core stable in the hedonic game (and thus, the correspond-
ing TU-game has an empty implementation core when the implementation
budget B is 0), we then precede as follows. We calculate the smallest B > 0
necessary for the implementation core of the TU-game to be non-empty. Each
allocation in such an implementation core provides information on a smallest
modication of the preference prole for the hedonic game (N;) such that
the partition  becomes core stable in the modied hedonic game (N;0).
More precisely, the payo¤ to each player in such an allocation indicates the
number of positions his coalition in  is to be raised in order to make  core
stable, and hence, the budget B indicates the Kemeny distance between the
modied hedonic game (N;0) and the original one (N;).
We present below the construction of the TU-game. Next, we provide a
few exploratory examples. We nish by analyzing the relation between the
hedonic game, its associated TU-game, and their respective cores.
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Consider the TU-game constructed in the following way.
1. Take a hedonic game (N;) in which playerspreferences over coalitions
are strict (i.e., for each i 2 N , the preferencei of player i is a complete,
transitive and antisymmetric binary relation over the collection Ni =
fS  N j i 2 Sg of coalitions containing i), and take a partition  of
N to be implemented.
2. For each player i 2 N , we record his ranking ranki(S;) of coalitions
in Ni based on his preferences i. The coalition at the bottom of
player is preference list is given the lowest rank 1, and the one at the
top is given the highest rank 2jN j 1 by that player2, i.e.,
 ranki(S;) =
fT 2 Ni j S i Tg for each S 2 Ni.
For example, in a game of three players, each player can be a member
of only four coalitions (i.e., when jN j = 3, jNij = 2jN j 1 = 4 for
each i 2 N) and thus, the coalition most preferred by a player is ranked
fourth by this player.
3. We then use playersrankings to construct (N; v) as follows. For each
nonempty coalition S  N ,
v(S) = minfdiffi(S; ;) j i 2 Sg;
where for each i 2 S,
diffi(S; ;) =
fT 2 Ni j S i T i (i)g
=
fT 2 Ni j S i Tg n fT 2 Ni j (i) i Tg
= max

0;ranki(S;)  ranki((i);)
	
;
and (i) is the unique member of  containing i, i.e. f(i)g = \N (i).
By this denition, the following connection between the individual ra-
tionality of partition , i.e., (i) i fig holding for each i 2 N , and 0-
normalization of the corresponding TU-game (N; v), i.e., v(fig) = 0 hold-
ing for each i 2 N , is obtained.
2Notice that our results hold true for any a¢ ne transformation of the RANK function.
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Fact 1  is individually rational if and only if (N; v) is 0-normalized.
Notice that v is constructed to capture whether a non-empty coalition
S  N is blocking  in the hedonic game (N;). By denition, v(S) = 0
implies that there exists a player i 2 S such that diffi(S; ;) = 0, and
moreover, diffi(S; ;) = 0 implies S 2 fT 2 Ni j (i) i Tg, i.e., (i) i
S. In other words, v(S) = 0 means that there exists a member of S who
(weakly) prefers her coalition in  to S, and therefore, has no incentive to
block  via S. On the other hand, v(S) > 0 implies that diffi(S; ;) > 0
for each i 2 S, i.e., S 62 fT 2 Ni j (i) i Tg for each i 2 S, and equivalently,
S i (i) for each i 2 S. In other words, v(S) > 0 means that  can be
blocked by S. Hence, the following fact is obtained.
Fact 2  is core stable in (N;) if and only if v(S) = 0 for each coali-
tion S  N .
Here we interpret the value of v(S) as the minimum compensation mea-
sured in units of ranks that the cheapestmember of S must be given to
make him prefer his coalition in  to S. For all other members of S the
compensation needed to induce the same change in preferences is at least as
high.
Last, we assume that the central authority that seeks to implement the
partition  as a core outcome has a budgetB  0 that it can use discretionary
to compensate players for their membership in . Given B we dene the
notion of an implementation core of the TU-game (N; v) as
i-core(N; v;B) =

x 2 RN
 x(N) = B and 8S  N;maxfxi   diffi(S; ;) j i 2 Sg  0

:
Notice that for B = v(N)  0 there is no di¤erence between the e¢ ciency
requirement for the standard core notion and the one dened above. More-
over, as we show in Fact 6 below, in the i-core the no-blocking conditions
with respect to each coalition are stronger than those in the standard core
denition. We refer to these condition as implementation conditions. We
further illustrate this point through the discussion of some examples in the
next section.
Fact 3 Each x 2 i-core(N; v;B) is non-negative.
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Proof. Each x 2 i-core(N; v;B) satises, for each i 2 N ,
xi   diffi(fig; ;) = maxfxj   diffj(fig; ;) j j 2 figg  0:
From non-negativity of each diffi(fig; ;), each xi is non-negative.
Fact 4
i-core(N; v;B)  i-core(N; v;B0) if B  B0.
Proof. It is obvious by observing that, for each x 2 i-core(N; v;B), an
element of i-core(N; v;B0) can be obtained by increasing a component of x,
say x1, by B0  B.
Fact 5  is core stable in (N;) if and only if i-core(N; v; 0) 6= ;.
Proof. By denition, we have x(N) = 0 for each x 2 i-core(N; v; 0). Then,
from Fact 3, i-core(N; v; 0) is either empty or equals to f0Ng. Moreover,
0N 2 i-core(N; v; 0) if and only if maxf diffi(S; ;) j i 2 Sg  0
for each S  N , which is equivalent to v(S)  0 for each S  N . By
denition, each diffi(S; ;) is non-negative, and thus, each v(S) is non-
negative as well. Therefore, from Fact 2,  is core stable in (N;) if and
only if i-core(N; v; 0) 6= ;.
Fact 6 i-core(N; v; v(N))  Core(N; v).
Proof. It su¢ ces to show that x(S)  v(S) for each S  N under the
assumption that maxfxi   diffi(S; ;) j i 2 Sg  0 for each S  N .
Let S  N be an arbitrary non-empty coalition. From Fact 3, we have
x(S)  v(S)  maxfxi j i 2 Sg   v(S) = maxfxi   v(S) j i 2 Sg:
By denition of v, we have, for each i 2 S,
xi   v(S) = xi  minfdiffj(S; ;) j j 2 Sg  xi   diffi(S; ;):
Hence, again by assumption, we have
x(S)  v(S)  maxfxi   diffi(S; ;) j i 2 Sg  0;
and the proof is completed.
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3 How to use the implementation core
With the help of the following examples we illustrate how the elements of the
implementation core can be used to minimally modify the preference prole
in the original hedonic game so that the desirable partition from the central
authoritys point of view becomes an element of core of the modied game.
Example 1 Take the following hedonic game.
1 2 3 ranki(S;)
12 23 13 4
13 12 123 3
1 2 23 2
123 123 3 1
The core of this hedonic game is empty.
Lets rst consider partition  = f12; 3g and notice that it is individually
rational. The corresponding TU-game is constructed as follows.
v(1) = diff1(1; ;) = 0
v(2) = diff2(2; ;) = 0
v(3) = diff3(3; ;) = 0
v(12) = minfdiff1(12; ;);diff2(12; ;)g = minf0; 0g = 0
v(13) = minfdiff1(13; ;);diff3(13; ;)g = minf0; 3g = 0
v(23) = minfdiff2(23; ;);diff3(23; ;)g = minf1; 1g = 1
v(123) = minfdiff1(123; ;);diff2(123; ;);diff3(123; ;)g
= minf0; 0; 2g = 0:
From v(1) = v(2) = v(3) = v(123) = 0, x 2 Core(N; v) only if x = 0N ,
but x = 0N implies x(12) = 0 < v(12). Therefore, Core(N; v) is empty,
and by Fact 6, the implementation core i-core(N; v;B) with respect to
B = 0 of this game is empty.
Let us now increase B so that we obtain a non-empty i-core(N; v;B):
in this case we need B  1. We focus on minimal increases to the budget and
thus consider i-core(N; v; 1). The two elements of the i-core are (0; 1; 0)
and (0; 0; 1). To verify that these are indeed i-core elements we need to
check that maxfx2   1; x3   1g  0 which is the case in both payo¤ vectors
(0; 1; 0) and (0; 0; 1).
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Now we are going to use the above information to modify the preference
prole of hedonic game (N;) such that  is in the core of the modied
game. We will interpret a zero payo¤ in the i-core element of the TU-game
as an indication that the corresponding players preference should remain
unchanged and a positive payo¤ as an indication that in the corresponding
players preference the ranking of his coalition in  should go up by the
number of places indicated by his payo¤. Thus, to render f12; 3g core stable,
 the i-core element (0; 1; 0) indicates to modify the preference prole
from  to 0 in such a way that 1=01 and 3=03, and then modify
the preference of player 2, 2 such that in the new preference02 one has
rank2(12;0) = 4 and rank2(23;0) = 3, i.e., 2 n 02= f(23; 12)g
and 02 n 2= f(12; 23)g.
 the i-core element (0; 0; 1) indicates to modify the preference prole
from  to 00 in such a way that 1=001 and 2=002, and then modify
the preference of player 3, 3 such that in the new preference 003,
rank3(3;00) = 2 and rank3(23;00) = 1, i.e., 3 n 003= f(23; 3)g
and 003 n 3= f(3; 23)g.
Notice that in both cases the modication of the original preference prole
renders f12; 3g core stable in (N;0) and (N;00), and that in both cases the
Kemeny distance between the original and modied proles is 1.
01 02 03 ranki(S;0)
12 12 13 4
13 23 123 3
1 2 23 2
123 123 3 1
and
001 002 003 ranki(S;00)
12 23 13 4
13 12 123 3
1 2 3 2
123 123 23 1
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Next, consider partition ' = f1; 2; 3g. Obviously, it is individually ratio-
nal. The corresponding TU-game is constructed as follows.
v'(1) = diff1(1; ';) = 0
v'(2) = diff2(2; ';) = 0
v'(3) = diff3(3; ';) = 0
v'(12) = minfdiff1(12; ';);diff2(12; ';)g = minf2; 1g = 1
v'(13) = minfdiff1(13; ';); (diff3(13; ';)g = minf1; 3g = 1
v'(23) = minfdiff2(23; ';);diff3(23; ';)g = minf2; 1g = 1
v'(123) = minfdiff1(123; ';);diff2(123; ';);rank3(123; ';)g
= minf0; 0; 2g = 0:
Again from v'(1) = v'(2) = v'(3) = v'(123) = 0, the implementation core
i-core(N; v';B) with B = 0 of this game is empty. Let us now consider an
increase in the discretionary budget to B = 3. Then i-core(N; v'; 3) is a
singleton and consists of the payo¤ vector (1; 1; 1). To see that this is indeed
an i-core element we focus on the coalitions with strictly positive claims:
12, 13, and 23. We have then maxfx1   2; x2   1g = maxf 1; 0g = 0  0,
maxfx1   1; x3   3g = maxf0; 2g = 0  0, and maxfx2   2; x3   1g =
maxf 1; 0g = 0  0, i.e., the implementation conditions are satised.
This unique core element indicates that we need to modify the prefer-
ence lists of all three players in the hedonic game by moving the respective
coalition up one rank. The modied preference prole is given below:
0001 0002 0003 ranki(S;000)
12 23 13 4
1 2 123 3
13 12 3 2
123 123 23 1
Clearly, partition ' = f1; 2; 3g is in the core of the modied hedonic game
(N;000). The Kemeny distance between the i and 000i is 1 for each player
i 2 N , and so the Kemeny distance between the original hedonic game (N;)
and the modied one (N;000) is 3.
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Example 2 Take the following hedonic game
1 2 3 4 ranki(S;)
12 23 13 14 8
1234 1234 1234 24 7
13 12 23 1234 6
14 2 3 4 5
1 24 34 34 4
123 123 123 234 3
124 124 234 124 2
134 234 134 134 1
and consider partition 1 = f1234g which is the only core element for (N;).
The characteristic function in the corresponding TU-game (N; v1) is
S 1 2 3 4 12 13 14 23 24 34 123 124 134 1234
v1(S) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
The unique i-core element with B = 0 is (0; 0; 0; 0) conrming the core
stability of partition 1.
Next consider partition 2 = f14; 23g. This partition is not an element
of the core of the hedonic game (N;) as it is blocked by coalition f13g as
13 1 14 and 13 3 23. The corresponding TU-game is as follows.
S 1 2 3 4 12 13 14 23 24 34 123 124 134 1234
v2(S) 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Clearly, the implementation core with B = 0 of this TU-game is empty. To
obtain a non-empty i-core the minimal increase in B must be such that
players 1 and 3 can jointly obtain at least 1, thus we rst try B = 1. Lets
rst consider allocation (0; 0; 1; 0), i.e. where the whole of the budget B = 1
is allocated to satisfy the claim of player 3. Notice, however, that in this case
the implementation condition is not satised:
max

x1   diff1(13; 2;)
x3   diff3(13; 2;)

= maxf0  1; 1  2g =  1 < 0:
The unique i-core element with B = 1 thus is (1; 0; 0; 0). To verify this
notice that
max

x1   diff1(13; 2;)
x3   diff3(13; 2;)

= maxf1  1; 0  2g = 0  0:
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Thus, we can consider a modication of hedonic game such that the rank
of coalition 14 is increased by 1 (from rank 5 to rank 6) and the rank of
coalition 13 is decreased by 1 (from rank 6 to rank 5) in the preference list
of player 1. We let all other playerspreference lists remain the same, in this
way we obtain the modied preference prole:
01 02 03 04 ranki(S;0)
12 23 13 14 8
1234 1234 1234 24 7
14 12 23 1234 6
13 2 3 4 5
1 24 34 34 4
123 123 123 234 3
124 124 234 124 2
134 234 134 134 1
Notice that the Kemeny distance between preference prole  and 0 is one.
It is easy to verify that partition 2 is an element of the core of the modied
hedonic game (N;0).
Last, consider partition 3 = f1; 2; 3; 4g. Clearly it is not a core element
of the hedonic game (N;) as it is blocked, for example, by coalition 12 as
12 1 1 and 12 2 2. The corresponding TU-game is as follows.
S 1 2 3 4 12 13 14 23 24 34 123 124 134 1234
v3(S) 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
The implementation core with B = 0 of the TU game is empty as B = 0
is insu¢ cient to satisfy the claim of coalition 13, for example. Further-
more notice, that increasing B to 2 is not su¢ cient to obtain a non-empty
implementation: consider the allocation (1; 0; 1; 0) where the claims of all
coalitions are satised and notice that this allocation is not implementable
as, for example,
max

1  diff1(12; 3;)
0  diff2(12; 3;)

= maxf1  4; 0  1g =  1 < 0:
Here the minimum increase in B to make i-core(N; v3 ;B) non-empty is
by 5, and the unique element of i-core(N; v3 ; 5) is (2; 1; 1; 1). To see that
12
this is indeed an element of the implementation core, notice that the alloca-
tion satised e¢ ciency, x1+x2+x3+x4 = 5, and as for the implementability
conditions we have:
max

2  diff1(12; 3;)
1  diff2(12; 3;)

= maxf2  4; 1  1g = 0;
max

2  diff1(13; 3;)
1  diff3(13; 3;)

= maxf2  2; 1  3g = 0;
max

2  diff1(14; 3;)
1  diff4(14; 3;)

= maxf2  1; 1  3g = 1;
max

1  diff2(23; 3;)
1  diff3(23; 3;)

= maxf1  3; 1  1g = 0;
max
8>><>>:
2  diff1(1234; 3;)
1  diff2(1234; 3;)
1  diff3(1234; 3;)
1  diff4(1234; 3;)
9>>=>>; = maxf2  3; 1  2; 1  2; 1  1g = 0:
The allocation dictates the following modications in the preference prole
of the hedonic game:
 Player 1s preference list: increase the rank of coalition 1 by two from
rank 4 to rank 6; and
 Players 2, 3, and 4s preference lists: increase the rank of the singleton
coalition by one.
The new revised preference prole is given below.
001 002 003 004 ranki(S;00)
12 23 13 14 8
1234 1234 1234 24 7
1 2 3 4 6
13 12 23 1234 5
14 24 34 34 4
123 123 123 234 3
124 124 234 124 2
134 234 134 134 1
13
Notice that the Kemeny distance between preference proles and00, which
is the sum of Kemeny distances between the individual playerspreference
lists is 5 which equals to the budget level B in the implementation core.
4 Implementation core and nearest hedonic
games
The discussion above clearly points out that given a hedonic game, a desir-
able partition, and its corresponding TU-game there are links between the
minimum budget level in the implementation core for which it is non-empty
and the Kemeny distance between the preference prole of the original he-
donic game and the modied game which is nearest to it and in which
the desirable partition is core stable. Next, we explore these relations more
formally.
Let  and 0 be two arbitrary proles. The Kemeny distance N(;0)
between  and 0 is dened as follows.
N(;0) =
X
i2N
i(;0);
where, for each i 2 N ,
i(;0) = 1
2
  i n 0i  [   0i n i 
=
1
2
 i n 0i +  0i n i :
Lemma 1
N(;0) 
X
i2N
max

diffi(T; ;) j T 2 Ni; (i) 0i T
	
:
Proof. Let i 2 N , let T 2 Ni satisfy (i) 0i T . It su¢ ces to show that i(
;0)  diffi(T; ;). When diffi(T; ;) = 0, the inequality obviously
holds. Suppose diffi(T; ;) > 0, and let k = diffi(T; ;). By denition,
there exist k coalitions S1; S2; : : : ; Sk 2 Ni such that
T = Sk i Sk 1 i    i S1 i (i):
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Then, it follows from transitivity that Sk i (i) and Sk i Sj i (i) for
each 1  j < k. From antisymmetry and (i) 0i S = Tk, we have Sk 60i (i),
and moreover, by combining with transitivity, we have Sk 60i Sj or Sj 60i (i)
for each 1  j < k. Hence, j i n 0i j is at least k. From completeness,
a 60i b implies b 0i a, and hence j 0i n i j is at least k as well. Therefore,
i(;0) is at least k.
A prole 0 is called (;)-normalized if for each i 2 N ,
 ranki((i);0)  ranki((i);), and
 for all S; T 2 Ni n f(i)g, S i T if and only if S 0i T .
Lemma 2 Each (;)-normalized prole 0 satises
N(;0) =
X
i2N
max

diffi(T; ;) j T 2 Ni; (i) 0i T
	
:
Proof. Let 0 be a (;)-normalized prole, let i 2 N , and let S 2 Ni be
the coalition satisfying (i) 0i S and
diffi(S; ;) = max

diffi(T; ;) j T 2 Ni; (i) 0i T
	
:
By denition of (;)-normalized prole, (i) 0i T 0 and T 0 i (i) if and
only if T 0 2 fT 2 Ni j S i T i (i)g. Since (i) 0i T 0 implies T 0 60i (i),
we have
j i n 0i j = j 0i n i j = jfT 2 Ni j S i T i (i)gj
= diffi(S; ;)
Therefore, i(;0) = max

diffi(T; ;) j T 2 Ni; (i) 0i T
	
for each
i 2 N , which implies the claim.
Observe that each (;)-normalized prole 0 can be uniquely deter-
mined (and constructed) by specifying the value of i(;0) for each i 2 N
in such a way that, for each i 2 N ,
 ranki((i);0) = ranki((i);) + i(;0),
 ranki(S;0) = ranki(S;)  1 if 0 < diffi(S; ;)  i(;0), and
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 ranki(S;0) = ranki(S;) otherwise.
In other words, for each i 2 N , (i) is raised i(;0) positions in player
is preference.
Let (N;) be the original hedonic game, and  be a partition of N .
Lemma 3 If  is core stable in (N;0) for some prole 0, then there exists
a (;)-normalized prole 00 such that (;00)  (;0) and  is core
stable in (N;00) as well.
Proof. First, assume that  is core stable in (N;0). It follows that each
non-empty coalition S  N satises (i) 0i S for some i 2 S, which is
equivalent to [
i2N
fS 2 Ni j (i) 0i Sg = 2N n f;g:
Let di = max

diffi(S; ;) j S 2 Ni; (i) 0i S
	
for each i 2 N . It follows
that
S 2 Ni j (i) 0i S
	  S 2 Ni j ranki(S;)  ranki((i);) + di	:
Let 00 be the (;)-normalized prole satisfying i(;00) = di for each
i 2 N . From Lemma 1 and 2, we have N(;00)  N(;0). Moreover,
by denition of 00, we have
S 2 Ni j (i) 00i S
	
=

S 2 Ni j ranki(S;)  ranki((i);) + di
	
:
It implies that
S
i2NfS 2 Ni j (i) 00i Sg = 2N n f;g, and therefore,  is
core stable in (N;00) as well.
Lemma 4 Let 0 be an arbitrary (;)-normalized prole. If  is core stable
in (N;0), then i-core N;; N(;0) 6= ;.
Proof. Suppose 0 is a (;)-normalized prole such that  is core stable
in (N;0). In the following, we show that, for each S  N ,
max

i(;0)  diffi(S; ;) j i 2 S
	  0:
Then, it follows that x = (x1; x2; : : : ; xn) satisfying xi = i(;0) for each
i 2 N is an element of i-core N;; N(;0), and we are done.
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Suppose S  N is such that minfdiffi(S; ;) j i 2 S
	
= 0. Since
i(;0) is non-negative, we have
maxfi(;0)  diffi(S; ;) j i 2 Sg  maxf diffi(S; ;) j i 2 Sg
= minfdiffi(S; ;) j i 2 Sg
= 0:
Now suppose S  N is such that diffi(S; ;) > 0 for each i 2 S, which im-
plies diffi(S; ;) = ranki(S;) ranki((i);) for each i 2 S. It implies
that S 6= (i) for each i 2 S, and moreover, from the fact that  is core stable
in (N;0), we have ranki((i);0) > ranki(S;0) for some i 2 S. Since 0
is a (;)-normalized prole, we have ranki(S;0) = ranki(S;)  1 and
ranki((i);0) = ranki((i);) + i(;0). Therefore,
i(;0)  diffi(S; ;) = i(;0) 
 
ranki(S;)  ranki((i);)

= ranki((i);0)  (ranki(S;0) + 1)
 0;
which implies maxfi(;0)  diffi(S; ;) j i 2 Sg  0.
Lemma 5 If i-core
 
N;;B 6= ;, then there exists a (;)-normalized
prole 0 such that  is core stable in (N;0) and N(;0)  B.
Proof. Let x 2 i-core N;;B, and let x be the (;)-normalized prole
such that, i(;x) = minfxi; 2n   ranki((i);)g for each i 2 N . Hence,
we have N(;x)  x(N) = B. Observe that, for each i 2 N , we have
ranki((i);x) = ranki((i);) + xi or ranki((i);x) = 2n 1, i.e., (i)
is raised xi positions or put at the top of player is preference list. In the
following, we show that  is core stable in (N;x).
By denition of i-core, we have, for each S  N , there exists i 2 S such
that xi   diffi(S; ;)  0. If diffi(S; ;) = 0, then we have (i) i S;
otherwise, i.e., diffi(S; ;) > 0, we have
xi  
 
ranki(S;)  ranki((i);)
  0:
When i(;x) = xi, we have ranki((i);x) = ranki((i);) + xi, and
thus,
ranki((i);x)  ranki(S;)  ranki(S;x);
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which implies (i) xi S. When i(;x) 6= xi, we have ranki((i);x) =
2n 1, i.e., (i) at the top of player is preference list with respect to x, and
obviously, (i) i S. Therefore,  is core stable in (N;x).
From Lemma 4 and 5, our main result is obtained.
Proposition 6 Let Bmin be the smallest non-negative budget such that
i-core(N; v;Bmin) 6= ;. Then, N(;0)  Bmin holds for each prole 0
such that  is core stable in (N;0), and moreover, this lower bound Bmin is
tight.
5 Further research
Our approach allows to completely order all partitions of a player set N with
respect to the extent to which they are stable in a pre-specied hedonic game
(N;). More precisely, for each partition  of N , one can uniquely assign the
minimal budget Bmin such that i-core(N; v;B

min) 6= ;. Then, naturally,
the complete order D over the set of all partitions of N is dened as follows:
for any two partitions  and 0,  D 0 if and only if Bmin  B0min. Clearly,
if the hedonic game has a non-empty core, then the top indi¤erence class of
D contains all core stable partitions in (N;).
Noticing that various matching problems can be seen as particular spec-
ications of a hedonic game, our idea of ordering the partitions with respect
to their stability could be useful for instance as to compare mechanisms (as-
signing partitions to each prole of preferences) in these specic matching
problems with respect to their stability properties. For instance, one could
say that a mechanism f is more stable than the mechanism g if, at each
preference prole, f D g with f and g being the partitions induced by
f and g, respectively. It may clearly happen that two mechanisms are not
comparable with respect to their stability and so, looking for comparable
mechanisms seems for us to be a valuable direction for further research.
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